Abstract-The communication technologies for automatic meter reading (smart metering) and for energy production and distribution networks (smart grid) have the potential to be one of the first really highly scaled machine-to-machine-(M2M)-applications. During the last years two very promising developments around the wireless part of smart grid communication were initialized, which possibly have an impact on the markets far beyond Europe and far beyond energy automation.
 A significant part of the communication paths will be wireless, so that there is no possibility for a physical protection of these paths.  The local metrological networks (LMN) between the sensors (meters) and the data collectors (gateways) provide only limited capacity with regard to bandwidth and frame size.  Many of the network elements are based on relatively small and low-cost embedded systems with only limited computing and memory resources.  The systems envisage an extended time of operation.
Even though individual elements, like meters, will be replaced after five to ten years, the overall communication architecture should be operated at least 15 to 20 years. This contribution gives a short overview on the state of the art with regard to security approaches for smart grid communications (Section II), then presents the proposals of the smart meter gateway protection profile (Section III), and discusses some important implementation issues (Section IV). It shows a cost benefit analysis in Section V, before making some conclusion and outlook.
II. STATE OF THE ART
Worldwide, a lot of activities are ongoing to investigate on the solutions for secure smart grid operations. This includes  A plethora of theoretical analyses and proposals, as they are summarized in excellent survey papers like [1] [2]or in the online bibliography [3] ,  Generic standardization efforts like from the USbased NIST [4] or the Europe-based CEN-CENELEC-ETSI Smart Grid Coordination Group [5] ,  Development of protocols and solutions for specific parts of the smart grid communication network, like IEC62351 [6] to be used over IEC61850, ZigBee Smart Energy Profile [7] or the specification from Wireless M-Bus EN13757 and Open Metering System (OMS) Group [8] , [9] . In this charivari of activities, the German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, BSI) was mandated by its governing ministry to design a protection profile (PP) and a technical directive (TR) for the communication unit of an intelligent measurement system (smart meter gateway PP) [10] and for the security module of a smart metering system (security module PP) [11] , which were released in March 2013. In Germany, these rules will be mandatory from 2015 onwards for newly installed meters with an annual turnover of more than 6 MWh or an installed energy producer with a peak power of more than 7 kW.
These specifications attracted broad attention in the community, and are candidates for wide application far beyond Germany, and far beyond the single application of smart metering. Therefore, this contribution presents the major characteristics of these specifications.
III. BSI SMART METER GATEWAY

A. Network Architecture
The technical directive consists of various documents on the different aspects of the overall architecture (cf. Fig.  1 ). These include the directives for the smart meter gateway (SMGW, BSI TR-03109-1), for the security module (BSI TR-03109-2), for the underlying cryptographic algorithms and implementations (BSI TR-03109-3), for the public key infrastructure (PKI, BSI TR-03109-4), and for the communication adaptors (BSI TR-03109-5). For the specific elements, additional test specifications are provided, so that a certification process can be supported. Fig. 2 , WAN) between the SMGW, the provider of the functionality (utility) and additional administration personnel.
B. Positioning
The result of the PP comes with a certain model character, as  The result of the specification is a reasonable compromise in a complex conflict of objectives. The achieved security level is ambitious, however, still realistic in terms of cost and administration complexity. It should be highlighted that -despite the quite specific requirements from the application -the specification is based on open and well established standards from the IT-world (i.e. like Transport Layer Security, TLS, like Common Criteria (CC) Certification), In order to make these rules applicable, a good number of specific implementation rules and guidelines are given.  The process of the specification is a good example for a guiding government, which regards strategic and customers interests, but also considers the interest of industry. The discussions were held in open discussions and extensive commenting rounds together with industry associations. It should be mentioned that the result of the process, of course, also has some weaknesses, but it is important that the strategic setup is reasonable and future proof.
C. Securing the Local Metrological Network
The LMS has to be secured -as all the other connection layers -with regard to both directions, i.e. from the meter to the SMGW and from the SMGW to the meter. That is, an attack to the SMGW or to the meter devices shall be avoided.
Generally, a symmetrically encrypted link is required, where Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) will probably be the most widely used algorithm.
As the use of a static key allows cookbook attacks, a dynamic key exchange is required for the bidirectional use cases. This is provided by asymmetric cryptographic algorithms, so that the exchanged key can be applied by efficient symmetric cryptographic algorithms.
This set of functionality is used in the public internet since years and can be supported by the transport layer security (TLS) protocol. Thus, it is reasonable to use that very protocol. To date, TLS is available in version 1.2, and has significantly improved since its early secure socket layer (SSL) days [12] , [13] . In the normal LMN case, the gateway takes the role of TLS server, whereas the meter acts as TLS client. Both devices run a mutual authentication based on X.509 certificates and key exchange during the TLS connection setup.
It is clear that TLS poses high demands to the computing and the communication resources of the systems. For this reason, a session -using a single key -may be operated for a complete month (31 days), before a new session has to be established. This can be performed together with the key exchange by asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. In addition, certificates can be used.
As an alternative, the session has to be re-established after a data volume of 5 MBytes. During this period, session resumption is allowed, renegotiation is prohibited.
As TLS frames can come with a significant length, an additional Authentication and Fragmentation Layer (AFL) is defined for the mapping onto a lean, short frame data channel.
In order to enable the integration of low-cost meters, the use of static keys in symmetric cryptography is allowed, but its use is restricted to unidirectional communication from the meter to the SMGW, so that the meters cannot be tampered. In doing so, it is assumed that the SMGW has some ex-ante knowledge about the meters in the field and can support some monitoring functionality, e.g. intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS) and packet filtering (firewall). In the unidirectional, as in the bidirectional case -requires a mutual authentication, which is also realized in the AFL.
A write access to the metering unit is allowed after a mutual authentication, where the gateway has to authenticate against the metering unit. And even then, those parts of the metering unit being covered by standard weights and measures law are not to be accessed. As a rule, the SMGW is the only communication interface for meters in the LMN.
D. Securing the Wide Area Network
It is also required to secure the communication into the wide area network (WAN) by TLS, supporting version 1.2 as a minimum. A fallback to an older version is prohibited. For the WAN communication, the gateway takes the role of the TLS client, its counterpart in the WAN acts as TLS server. The connection setup starts with a certificate based mutual authentication, where the certificates are generated by the Smart Metering Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
It is important to mention that the SMGW does not accept any incoming TLS connection requests from the WAN. But as it is essential to have arbitrary access to the gateway for administration and readout purposes, an additional wake-up service is supported. In case of a wakeup signal, the gateway connects to a pre-configured (and therefore secure) server in the WAN.
In case of WAN connection, the TLS session may be operated a maximum of two days. Also here, session resumption is allowed.
It is very important to have an extensive role concept for the users from the WAN. Most important roles are e.g. consumer, (energy) network utility, producer, and administrator. It is especially to be mentioned that  It is assumed that the gateway administrator and the service technician are trustworthy and well-trained.  The introduction of the role of external administrator is a very important towards a more flexible mode of system integration. In the end, it is clear that the role and the task of this administrator are not yet exactly and completely clarified. The tasks might include configuration, monitoring, administration of certificates and certificate updates, or NTP-server management. Open questions in this context are mostly around the open issues of public Internet protocol family, like network time protocol (NTP) or domain name service (DNS) protocol, which possibly should be secured by their counterparts SNTP or SDNS.
E. Securing the Home Area Network
The local access has bug functional importance, as it allows the direct access to data and to devices. In conjunction with smart grid applications, the so called home area network (HAN) might also enable the connection of controllable local systems (CLS), i.e. decentralized generator units, like photovoltaic systems, combined heat and power (CHP) units, electric vehicle, or alike. These units can be remotely controlled by a backend system, where the SMGW offers a TLS proxy service. There are two TLS connections being terminated in the SMGW: one connection from the backend to the SMGW, and one connection from the SMGW to the CLS.
If devices in the HAN have a separate connection to parties in the WAN (beside the gateway) this connection shall be appropriately protected, which in effect leads to
F. Securing the Gateway
Obviously, the SMGW plays a central role in the architecture, as it has to deal with the administration of the connections, with the encryption and decryption functionality, and with the storage of the key and certification materials. If the SMGW fails to be secure, then the complete security concept is to be questioned. Thus, it has to be especially secured and a security module has to be used. A security module is a secure cryptoprocessor that can store cryptographic keys and protects information. It might be a separate IC or a function block integrated into a CPU chip. A specification for such a trusted platform module (TPM) is developed by trusted computing group (TCG) [14] . In addition, BSI specifies a certified module along the rules of common criteria (CC).
The TPM secures the cryptographic identity of the gateway and offers cryptographic functions as a service provider. I.e. it enables functions for key generation, for generation and verification of digital signatures, and for key negotiation. In addition, it reliably generates random numbers, and securely stores keys and certificates.
The implementation of the complete SMGW shall conform to the evaluation assurance level (EAL) 4+ of Common Criteria. This EAL poses already high requirements with regard to the organization and the structure of the development processes.
It is assumed that the SMGW is installed in a nonpublic environment within the premises of the consumer which provides a basic level of physical protection. This protection covers the gateway, the meter(s) that the gateway communicates with and the communication channel between the SMGW and its security module.
The security module should be physically integrated into the SMGW, which includes sealing on the SMGW PCB. The mounting of the security module shall be done during the production process under secured conditions.
G. Logging
The SMGW shall also provide logging functionalities. This includes consumer logs, system logs and calibration logs. Different timing and access conditions apply.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
A. Overview
With regard to device architecture, two aspects are to be considered and currently being discussed. Both aspects mainly apply to the gateway and include the hardware architecture (cf. section B) and the software architecture (cf. section A).
B. HW Architecture
The BSI Protection Profile does not want to imply any concrete HW architecture for the components. However, it shows three examples of physical representations for the different components of the Smart Metering Systemfocusing on the SMGW. Fig. 3 shows implementation type 1, where the SMGW is integrated into one device comprising [10] :  The security relevant parts (i.e. SMGW security functionality, TSF)  The non-security relevant parts of the SMGW, e.g. the unit for communication, and  The Security Module that is a target of a separate evaluation but is physically located in the device. The Gateway communicates with one or more meters in the LMN, provides an interface to the WAN and provides interfaces to the HAN.
The components SMGW and meter might also be realized by a single physical device providing functionality of both. Such a "One Box Solution" is shown as type 2 architecture in Fig. 4 . This solution may be the preferred implementation for one family houses or large houses with several flats where all electricity meters are installed in one single cabinet. The components SMGW and meter may also be realized by a single physical device providing functionality of both.
From a security perspective this solution has the advantage that the communication between the gateway unit and the meters inside happens in the protected area of the box (assuming that the connection is realized wired or by optical means that are protected by the box). Anyway the communication between gateway and meters inside the box has to be encrypted.
In this context it is relevant that there is one physical unit (in form of a sealed box/cabinet) that provides an adequate level of physical protection over the Gateway, its meters and the communication channel between. However, also in this case this PP requires the implementation of an external interface for additional meters outside the box that is protected by cryptographic functionality. Fig. 5 acknowledges that there may be functional aspects in the context of a SMGW that are essential for the overall operation of the SMGW but not required to en-force the security functionality of the SMGW. Those functionalities may also be implemented in form of external components that do not belong to the SMGW. Classic examples of such functionality are the communication capabilities to the WAN, LMN or HAN. As long as the requirements for separate networks, encryption and so forth are implemented within the Gateway TSF it may be possible to utilize an external communication component. A failure of such a component would of course lead to an inoperative Gateway. However-as the availability of the Gateway is not within the focus of the requirements in this PP -this would not violate any security requirement.
The requirements around physically separated interfaces for different networks also apply to this configuration as indicated by the multiple arrows between the SMGW and its external communication components.
C. HW Selection-Security Module
There already is a good number of TPM products available. This also includes microprocessor units, such as i. 
D. SW Architecture
The same requirement holds true with regard to the software platform. Looking at the requirements for the certification, which include white box analysis, there might be three general alternatives:  Use a dedicated communication stack, like emBetterSSL from the authors' team [http://www.stzedn.de/embetter-webserver.132.html], which is completely available in source code and under full control.  Second alternative would be the use of a standard Linux, which already comes with a reasonable security level, but which would cause a major significant effort to go through the certification process.  Third alternative would be the direct use of EAL4+ certified OS, like QNX.
E. Discussions
The discussions about the hardware and the software platform lead to the simple and not at all new insight that it is very reasonable to use pre-developed and precertified products. Thus, cost per piece might go up, but eventually development and certification cost would be significantly reduced.
V. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. Introductory Remarks
It is obvious that the additional requirements from ch. III cause additional cost. It is clear that security is not a function as such, but it also should be clear that without the provision of security, no functionally safe operation could be achieved. In addition, data security and privacy are required for user acceptance, both from utility and consumer side.
Therefore, security is a sine qua non for the market success and for the stable and safe operation of a large scale network.
On the cost side, the Total Cost of Ownership (TCOO) during the complete lifetime is to be considered, including complete investment, installation and operational costs.
B. Cost Analysis-Devices
On the meter and the gateway sides, additional hardware resources are required for the implementation of the symmetric and possibly the asymmetric cryptography. The meter requires small amount of additional RAM and flash memory, the gateway itself requires the security module.
Consequently, there is no doubt about a certain cost adder; however, if this adder is put into relation to the total cost, including housing, logistics, and replacement (installation), it will be in the range of around 5 %.
Another critical issue comes from the energy adder for the additional data exchange and the additional computations. Especially for the generation of new key, this might be significant. With the continuing progress of semiconductor scaling, the energy spent in the microcontroller remains negligible in comparison with the energy spent for the communication part.
C. Cost Analysis-Complexity of Network and Operations
In general, higher cost should be expected due to the increasing complexity of the network and its operation. In conjunction with the increased exchange of data, e.g. with TLS, long frames or multiple fragmented frames are required, which leads to a higher load of the communication channel and of the required energy spent for the communication.
In addition, the administration processes during the commissioning and the operational phases will play a significant part. Keys shall be administrated, distributed, and kept up-to-date; role concepts shall be developed and implemented; monitoring shall be pursued.
D. Cost Analysis -Development
Additional cost will be observed also in the development and the certification process. Again, this adder has to be understood from the global context. Many companies already follow intense internal processes, which are in big parts identical to the given requirements. And if this is not the case, yet, then it is reasonable to start their definition and implementation. Having in mind the complexity of a stable product support for many generations, companies anyhow will not go without a reasonable process.
One further aspect will be observed: The certification process will lead to longer product life cycles, shorter iterations cannot be supported. This effect could be observed in many other application fields, e.g. in medical technology or air and space technologies. Although it was anticipated that this effect would hinder innovation, it at the same time led to more stable products and more consolidated processes.
